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News coverage of transportation disasters, such as the crash of Delia 
Flight 1141, reveal the disaster behavior of passengers, flight personnel and 
rescue workers. Within a mystery framework, the Flight 1141 discourse 
provides clues that readers can use to construe( their own disaster behavior 
awareness. The media must expand their pedagogical role beyond natural 
and technological disasters and begin providing basic airplane safety behav-
ior information. 
At 9:00 a.m. on August 31. 1988. Della Flighl11 41 crashed on take·off 
in DallaslFort Worth , Texas, kil ling 13 and leaving 94 survi vors. The fli ght, 
destined for Salt Lake City, Utah. originated in Jackson, Mississippi , and 
had a scheduled stop· over at DallaslFort Worth. This di saster, like Three 
Mile Island, the Challenger space shuttle and Bhopal. was a spec ific kind 
of tragedy: sudden, unexpected. and wholly inexplicable. Un like the other 
disasters. however. the crash of Delta 1141 was one of many transponati on 
disasters covered by the mass media and was one of th e many survivable 
crashes that have occ urred throughout aviation history. Survivab le crashes 
are those where passengers survive the impact of the crash . According to 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) . lives lost in airplane 
disasters deemed "survivable" are attributed to inadequate evacuati on 
plans. lack of communication among parties or lack of passenger awareness 
as to role expectations (Safety Study 1985). 
In disaster situations the mass media serve as wartling agents. relayers 
of disasterlhazard information and as educators (Disasters and the Mass 
Media 1980; Quarantelli 1989; Sorenson 1983). Disaster research, how· 
ever. has focused on natural di sasters, the community affected andlor the 
role of the media. Studies of disaster news have centered around the 
inadequacies of disaster coverage and the perpetuation of disaster myths 
(Blong 1984; Quaranteili 1989; Wenger and Friedman 1986). Such myths 
include the portrayal of helpless individuals and organi zations who are 
unable to deal with the weather. or the poli tical and economic policies that 
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threaten them (Wilkins 1985 , 1986), Others have noted that some disasters 
occur within a complex system making them hard to capture in their raw 
form (Walters et aL 1989), The media, as a result, break disasters down into 
simple explanations lacking in social, political and technological contellt 
(Altheide 1976), During the Three Mile Island incident, for example, CBS 
presented technological danger within a "nightly warning, nightly explana-
tion" format whereas ABC presented a fable of a threatening nightmare that 
the elite could not handle (Nimmo 1984, p, 64). Disasters, such as Three 
Mile Island, also create rhetorical crises wherein technological reasoning 
can fail to offer the communicative processes we need to solve our modem 
problems (Farrell and Goodnight 1981). Others, such as the Challenger 
space shuttle explosion, create situations of "' inappropriate death ' grief 
reactions" for the nation and the media playa role in the social mourning 
and grieving process (Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos 1986, p. 181). Finally, 
some disaster news narrati ves perpetuate disaster myths (Quarantelli 1988; 
Wilkins 1985, 1986) and others, such as airpl ane crash stories, encourage 
"naive beliefs aboUl the safety of air travel" (Vincent et aL 1989, p. 24) . 
While these studies have furthered our insight into the mass media and 
di sasters much work needs to be don e. We must go beyond natural disasters 
and nuclear accidents and examine the mundane, the everyday-the mass 
transportation disaster. Furthermore, we need to broaden our understanding 
of the di saster narrati ve. People read or watch these stories to learn about 
the di saster and the people involved yet the discourse as a voi ce of disaster 
educati on has not been explored. In other words, we have not asked: What 
are the media telling the public about the event and the behavi ors we should 
engage in during a di saster? In this paper we begin to address these issues 
by focusing on the crash of Delta Flight 1141. 
Disaster News as Interpretive Packages 
The stewardesses or stewards, if you got them, will come out and 
say: here's how you work your oxygen thing, th e little thing that 
comes out of the ceiling. Well, probably half will just plain blow 
that off, because if they fl y at all they' ve seen it all before. The little 
yellow thing comes out of the ceiling and they put it on. Yet, 
somehow or another, when the plane has cras hed or the passengers 
become aware they are in some kind of danger, or there is a sudden 
cabin deflation and fire and those things come out of the ceiling, I 
bet half of them don't know what to do becau se they're panic 
stricken. That's what happened in Airport , that movie. That's 
Garner: The Common Disaster and the Unexpected Education 157 
probably a pretty accurate film because news stories tell us the same 
thing (Interview, September 1992). 
Do news stories tell us tile same thing? Interviews, like this one, indicate 
that as we struggle to understand events we can not (and do not want to) 
experience we draw upon a variety of resources including the media. 
Disasters, such as airplane crashes, are abstractions for most people. None-
theless, they become part of our common stock of knowledge through 
personal, shared and mediated experience. "People construct and mOdify 
their understandi ng in an active environment that is constantly offering 
them images and potential schemata, suggesting how an issue is to be 
understood and what should be done about it" (Gamson 1988, p. 171). That 
the mass media tell us how to behave before, during, and after a disaster 
event is a common belief (Disasters and the Mass Media 1980; Quarante lli 
1988, 1989; Sorenson 1983). Yet, perhaps because the belief is so wide-
spread , this area of disaster discourse has ne ver been studied. Disaster 
researchers and practitioners alike have been acti ng like teachers without a 
lesson plan; aware that something should be said but unaware of what it is 
and how it might be interpreted. 
We can begin by examining the 1988 crash of Delta Flight 1141. The 
1141 crash was selected because it was a "typical" plane crash in that it 
occurred on take-off (most crashes occur on take-off or landing) and 
because there were survivors (most plane crashes are survivable) (Safety 
Study 1985). The focus is not on the most recent airplane disaster or the 
largest; rather it is on the most common or "typical" di saster. The questi on 
is: How was this discourse framed by the print media? That is, what did the 
media tell us was the basic issue or concern of the crash? What frames 
explained the di saster to those experiencing, and those far removed from, 
the event? Finally, what did the discourse tell us about the safety of fl ying 
and how we should behave in a disaster? By examining this issue we can 
broaden our understanding of the various interpretive packages that the 
media present to us in their attempt to explain such unexpected, yet wholly 
common, events. 
The study focuses on the first three days of Delta 1 141 crash coverage 
(August 31-September 2, 1988) by six newspapers: The Dallas Morning 
News, The Dallas Times Herald, The HOltsron POSI (crash site papers), The 
Clarion Ledger (Jackson, Miss.), The Jackson Daily News (flight origin 
papers) and The Salt Lake Tribune (fl ight destination paper). Location of 
the disaster, flight origination and flight destination determined newspaper 
selection. The largest amount of coverage occurred during thi s period and 
totaled in 35 I state, local and AP news stories, photographs and diagram 
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stories. It should be noted that Fensch (1990) also conducted a study of the 
1141 crash, however, he focused solely on AP reporters and their news 
stories. This study goes beyond Fensch' s and examines the published 
discourse available to the public at large. 
Analyzing the continuous record of this discourse allowed us to outline 
the central frames that sbaped the national and local public's acquaintance 
with the crash . All media elements tied to a topic can become part of our 
interpretive package or parcel that we carry about disasters. As Gamson and 
ModigJiani (1989) state, "media discourse is pan of the process by which 
individuals construct meaning" (p . 2). That is, each news story, each 
conversation about the 1141 disaster, is much li ke the food stuffs we pack 
into a grocery bag. Each item (package) in the grocery bag is different but 
together the i terns form the contents of our bag and our meals. Following 
Gamson (1988), we argue that the Delta 1141 disaster discourse, like other 
discourse, has its own culture in which there are competing and constantly 
changing packages avai lable for interpretation. The newspapers and stories 
used in this study serve as an indicator of the packages people can use to 
construct their interpretation of the Delta crash. Most of us would not read 
all of these publications, but they were available to those who wanted to 
make sense of the crash through local, national and personal discourse. 
Story Frame 
Determining the overall story frame, or central point of the story, allows 
us to conclude the context in which safety information appeareD. "The frame 
suggests what the issue is abo ut. It answers the question "what is the basic 
source of controversy or concern on this issue?" (Gamson 1988, p. 165; van 
Dijk 1988 ; Pan and Kosicki 1993). The 351 news stories, photographs and 
diagrams covereD every topic from victim lists to stories about media 
coverage of the crash. The ten overall story frames identified are shown in 
table 1. As seen from table 2 below, the most common story frame was the 
passenger story. The overall frame of "other" had a higher number of stories 
but thi s was due to the mix of stories related to the crash but not to the study. 
Table 2 totals to more than 351 stories because some stories had two key 
story frames (e.g., Passenger Story and Accident Crash). 
A viation Safety Themes 
Because disaster news narratives can serve as a voice for disaster 
education we looked fortext that related to issues of aviation safety. Federal 
Aviation Administration and Nati onal Transportation Safery Board studies, 
the Sioux City , Iowa, crash in 1989, and our research on respondent 
understanding of aviation safety , serveD as a foundation for theme devel-
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Table 1. Transportation Disaster Story Frames 
Frame 
Accident/Crash 
Crash Site Rescue 









The crash event itself; crash recap 
Rescue efforts at the crash site 
Examinati on/in vestigation of the plane 
Passengers' experiences, their lives, etc. 
Those who died in crash; victim li sts 
Rescue worker trai ning , work prior to, or 
during, the crash 
Crash site community stories; witnesses; 
hospitals; hotels; aid to passengers. 
victims, families 
Stories about previous plane crashes 
Articles about the crash on Op/Ed page 
Crash stories that did not fit other categories 
Table 2. Overall Story Frames 
Frame No. Stories 
Passenger Story 70 (24P/6D)* 
Crash Si te Plane 49 (22P/9D ) 
Rescue Warkers 30 (18P) 
Accident/Crash 26 (l 3P/I D) 
Other Aid 26 OP/ l D) 
Previous Crashes 25 (5PIl D) 
Victi m Story 24 (SP) 
Crash Site Rescue 12 (9P) 
Op/Ed 6 (OP/OD) 
Other 107 ( 16P/9D ) 
*p = photograph; D - diagram 
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opmen!. Aviation safety discou rse involves four key themes: passenger 
safety, fli ght personnel safety , plane safety and rescue. Briefly, passenger 
safety themes are references to such activities as using seat belts, storing 
items on board the plane, opening emergency exits, and/or helping others 
exit the plane. "Many of the passengers, however, reportedl y escaped the 
wreckage on their own, many of them through the emergency exits. Some, 
however, had trouble with the doors" (Pusey 1988, p. 1) is a good example. 
Flight personnel safety themes are references to pilot or fli ght attendant 
(raining, years fl ying, age, and/or activities after the crash. "He did not get 
the proper readings from one of his engines. He decided to go back to the 
gate ... " (Gamboa 1988, p. 1) is a flight safety statement. Plane safety 
themes are references to the probable cause of the crash , to meeting industry 
standards, and/or to the safety of similar airplanes. An example is : "Three 
years ago, a Delta L-1011 crashed at the same airport ... " (Shannon 1988, 
p. 2). Finall y, rescue themes are references to rescue personnel training, 
availability to victims and/or rescue actions. For example, "D-FW airport 
rescuerS arrived within three minutes after the jet went down" (Kerr and 
Laws 1988, p. 14) is a rescue theme. 
In addition to full sentences, we identified phrases, lexical meanings, 
metaphors, si miles, and so on. To provide a sense of how prevalent safety 
themes are within the news discourse we counted the number of paragraphs 
where safety tbeme references were found. Of the 35 1 stories studied 43 
percent were found to also contain at least one aviation safety theme. A total 
of 613 paragraphs were identifi ed as safety theme paragraphs: 34 percent 
were passengers themes, 24 percent were flight safety, 29 percent were 
plane safety and] 4 percent were rescue safety themes. As can be seen from 
table 3 below, some safety themes were stronger than others but together 
they serve as a voice of disaster education. 
Story frames , more often than not, contained a mixture of all aviation 
themes. The four strongest story frames, and the aviation themes that 
appeared, are discussed below. 
Reading the Delta 1141 Story 
An airplane crash disrupts the normal fabri c of everyday life and every-
thing we know and trust ends or is severely jarred. Wh i Ie this is especially 
true for those directly affected by the crash, it is also true for those of us 
who read about the crash. At a very basic level, airplane crashes remind us 
that things go wrong and we can die. The Delta 1141 news stories served 
as a constant reminder of thi s fact as they worked to frame the disaster as a 
mystery to be so lved. By mystery I mean an "unknown." The mystery of 
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Table 3. Safety Themes within Story Frames 
Story Frame TP* Passenger Flight Plane Rescue 
Passenger 703 137 25 24 11 
Crash Site Plane 397 16 39 45 
Rescue Workers 285 8 I 2 29 
Accident/Crash 360 38 9 15 10 
Other Aid 281 5 0 1 20 
Previous Crash 242 0 8 7 8 
Victims 253 2 3 0 
Crash Rescue 107 14 4 11 12 
Op/Ed 62 2 3 2 
Other 1431 20 67 72 7 
"'TP::: Total story paragraphs; lheme numbers refer to paragraphs containing a safety 
theme reference for that category. 
the crash is, after all, a real one; for during the first three days (and often 
months) after the crash both the cause of the accident, and how passengers 
survived the crash , remains unknown. The news stories reflect thi s fact in 
both a real and literary sense by reporting the facts of the crash , and tales 
of passenger survi val, within a predictable dramatic fram ework of setting 
(crash site), actors (pi lot, passengers, FAA officialS), plotts), and a "to-be-
continued" ending. The ending helps to establish a mystery framework like 
that in the game of Clue (e.g., was it Colonel Mustard with the candle stick 
in the library?). The use of the mystery frame is not intended to be a fonnal 
typology but rather a means of ordering my interpretation of the news stories 
(Goffman 1959, 1974; Young 1990). 
A Mystery is Established: Accident/Crash Stories 
Accident/crash stories are usually the lead stories on the first day of 
coverage and focus primarily on piecing together what happened and why. 
Ult imately, the story frame serves primarily as a prelude, or introduction, 
to the other Delta 1141 stories. The lead story in the Dallas Morning News 
on September 1, is a good example. The article "Piecing together the 
tragedy" (Minutaglio and Jacobson 1988, p. lA) retells the story of the crash 
chronologically, beginning with a depiction of the scene before the crash 
("a beautiful morning for a flight") as being normal and routine. This scene 
changes "in just a few minutes" to "a harrowing experience of fear, courage 
and unanswered questions. " These stories are typically the first ones pub-
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Iished when infonnation is at its thinnest; wh en little is known about the 
exact number of survivors (if any); and even less is known about the cause 
of the crash. Because of these conditions a to-be-continued ending to the 
story is inevitable and works to establi sh the mystery both explicitly and 
implicitl y. Used in the retell ing of the event are speculations by unnamed 
sources ("fire in the left engine"), eyewitness and passenger accounts of the 
crash ("the least injured climbed out on their own") (Makovy 1988, p. Al), 
and secondary information about past airline and airport disasters (Delta 
191 crash; American DelO aborted takeoff). The Delta 1141 discourse 
provides readers with clues to the mystery of the crash and passenger 
survival through descriptions of the plane ("i t bu rst into flames"), of 
passenger behaviors ("we jumped on the wing"), of possible villains (pilot, 
mechanic, Mother Nature) and, final!y, the promise of a soluti on to the 
mystery (NTSB "would remain at the scene") (Pego 1988, pp. I, 2). The 
promise to sol ve the mystery continues in the other story frames, especially 
the Crash Site Plane Stories. Even more importan tly, the aviation themes 
(passenger, fli ght personnel, plane and rescue safety) appeared repeatedly 
throughout the narratives. The Passenger stories, for example, provide the 
strongest sense of what it would be like to survive a crash and then escape 
the airplane. 
A Struggle for Survival: Passenger Stories 
Passenger stories concentrated on the Delta 1 141 survivors, al lowing the 
reader to "experience" the crash through the retelling of the event. Passen-
gers' thoughts and behavior, before and after the crash, give the reader a 
composite view of the crash and what it wou ld be like to survive and to 
escape the plane. 
Within this retelling of experiences the passenger safety theme was the 
strongest. Phrases such as "You were just looking for a way to get out of 
tbe plane and hope you weren't going to die" or "Thompson saw someone 
struggling to pry open the emergency hatch ... " conveyed not only what was 
happening but the steps that people took to escape the plane. Found within 
pictures and phrases were the actions Delta 1141 passengers had to take, or 
wanted to take, during the event. These phrases and images conveyed what 
passengers did (escape); the problems they meet with (locked doors); whom 
they re lied on and the various ways they responded to the crash. All of these 
stories showed that most of the passengers escaped the wreckage on their 
own; some through holes in the fu selage, others through the emergency 
exits. "On their own, most of the survivors had fled the plane by the time 
emergency workers arrived, officials said" (Tomaso and Crawford 1988, p. 
27). 
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Glim and hi s wife released their seat be lts and made their way to 
the first class section, but they couldn't get out. ... [Bob Jones] was 
in Seat 4C, just behind the emergency exit on the right side of the 
plane .... People were panicked, but nobody was pushing or shov-
ing," he said. "It was every man for himself. None of the crew came 
on the public address system to give any information about what 
was happening or how to get off the plane" .' [Jerry Galloway] 
moved toward the back of the plane , where the flames were, to help 
a woman who seemed to be struggling with her seat belt. She 
escaped without his aid, so he moved to the front of the plane and 
helped people climb through the hole in the fu selage (Woolley 
1988a, p. 1, 18). 
Some passenger safety statements also include plane safety or fli ght 
safety themes. For example, "The stewardess began screaming. 'Get off' 
Get off" survivors told him, and ' instincts took over and they followed 
orders'" (Tomaso and Crawford 1988, p. 27). Refe rences within the stories 
to flight personnel, other than the pilot, are rare but this is a good example 
of flight personne l providing the guidance most passengers seem to expect 
after a plane crash. It also illustrates the kind of image that most airlines 
wish to convey; that is, the sense that if there is a crash, there will be 
someone to help you and guide you (usuall y a flight attendant). Thi s appears 
to be an image most passengers carry with them (Safety Study 1985). It is, 
however, inaccurate, for fl ight attendant survival is no more insured than 
passenger survival. 
The statement: "Bettes said he was in seat 19A, a window seat one row 
in front of an emergency exit" (Pusey 1988, p. 1) is a good example of the 
passenger and plane safety theme. The statement conveys two i mages: First, 
the plane does provide avenues of escape and one of the survi vors sat near 
this avenue. Second, for hislher own survival, it would be wise for the 
passenger to sit near an exit. This corresponds to a popular belief, by many 
who fl y, that one pan of an airplane is safer than another. Encouraging this 
belief further are plane safety statements such as the follo wing: "NTSB 
offi cials said they planned to examine the seating assignments to see if a 
pattern of survivability emerges. Dr. Nizam Peerwani , Tarrant County's 
medical examiner said , however, that all of the victims had been seated in 
the rear of the plane" (Pusey 1988, p. 14). 
The story by Minutaglio and Jacobson ( 1988) ends with the quote: "I'm 
a firm believerthat when it' s a man' s time to go, it 's his time .... It wasn' t 
my time." The idea thi s imparts is that there is little one can do to prevent 
these events from happening and if caught in such a situation, whether you 
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survive is a matter of luck or destiny. NTSB research shows that this is not 
the case; that a passenger's knowledge of safety practices and procedures 
helps to ensure hislher life, as weU as the lives of thei r fellow passengers. 
Despite the underlying tone of fatalism within these stories, there is another 
message-that of self-help. 
Christensen said she was sitting next to an exit door, and after the 
crash "I pulled it open but it was on fire. The flames just jumped 
in. " 
... Christensen said she ran across the aisle of the Boeing 727 
and took the sizable jump down to what seemed like very unsafe 
ground (Flood 1988, p. 14). 
Pictures of survivors , and images of passengers sliding down wings, 
finding exits (through doors or gaping holes) and aiding others, convey the 
idea that passengers respond to the situation and do not wait for the flight 
attendants or rescue personnel to assist them. This is a true-to life image of 
what these situations require, but it is not one the airlines want you to have 
nor is it one many passengers themselves ha ve (Safety Study 1985). 
The Plot Thickens: Crash Site Plane Stories 
Crash site airplane stories focus on the plane itself, the wreckage, the 
crash investigation, comparisons with similar models or accidents, and the 
airplane's history. While the mystery theme is, at least, implicitly present 
in all of the stories, it is especially strong in these stories because they focus 
on the crash and a search for an explanation. Mixed with images of NTSB 
investigators inspecting the crash and speculating as to the cause of the crash 
(trying to solve the mystery). are reports of previous crashes involving 
similar planes, with similar engines. Not surprisingly, also within these 
stories are the plane safety and fli ght safety themes. 
Was it the plane? Plane safety themes focus on all aspects of the crash 
(cause, investigation, history) but in the Delta 1141 crash they centered 
primaril y on the "plane's engines and wing flaps ." References to history of 
either the 727s Of the engine on these planes framed much of the dialog. As 
the sample below highlights, these stories begin with a statement that the 
Delta 1141 plane was a "common and nonnally safe transport." The story 
continues by citing previous problems and crashes and concludes with the 
somewhat reassuring statement that, again , only minor problems have 
occurred throughout the plane's history. 
The plane was a Boeing 727 -200, a commonly used aircraft with a 
good safety record and powered by engines found on two thirds of 
the nation 's commercial jets. . The jet was equipped with two 
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versions of the JT8D, which many industry experts considered a 
reliable power plant . ... In August 1985 , a JT8D engine on a British 
AirtoUfS Boeing 737 burst open when the jet was on its takeoff roll 
at Manchester, England, causing the jet to catch ftre .... The 
Milwaukee crash in September 1985 involved problems with spac-
ers in the turbines of a different version of the JT8D engine on a 
Midwest Express DC-9. The aircraft used for Flight 1141 had had 
only minor problems in the last five years, FAA reports show 
(Garcia 1988, p. 28) 
The theme also focuses on where surviving passengers or flight person-
nel sat or escaped from , and where the victims died. The following state-
ment about flight attendant Dixie Dunn, illustrates this point. "But 
Wednesday, she was training a junior employee in first-class, so Dunn was 
sitting in the back jump seat of Flight 14]] to service the rear of the p lane, 
where 11 of the 13 fatali ties were killed by flames and smoke" (Needham 
1988, p. 16). The next example indicates that seating can determine your 
fate bullhere is no guarantee. 
Edmond and Marian Fadal , like their traveling companions Frank 
and Jean Nix, gave no thought to where they would sit during Delta 
Flight 1141. But those seat assignments defined who lived and who 
died .... They arranged in advance to sit together-Jean Nix in 
window seat20A, her husband next to her, Edmond Fadal, 63, took 
the aisle seat and wife Marian 65, sat just across the isle .... [After 
the crash] Edmond Fadal and the Nixs unfastened their seat belts 
and tumbled from the plane [Mrs. Fadal died] (Zamichow 1988, p. 
16) 
The Dallas Times Herald, like the other papers, used diagrams to help 
tell the story of this crash. The diagram, "Cross-Section of Flight 1141" 
(Dallas Times Herald 1988, p. B5), for example. illustrated the damage to 
the plane itself, the location and status of emergency exits (open or closed) , 
as well as the victims' locations. Such diagrams locate for the reader areas 
of damage to the plane, as well as areas where passengers lived and died 
and, like the above statements, indicate for the reader that some areas of the 
plane are safer than others. 
Was it the crew? The mystery theme is refue led again, within crash site 
plane stories, by references to previous crashes caused by pilot error and 
speculations as to the role the flight crew or pilot in thi s crash. These 
speCUlations, however, also promote flight safety themes by focusing on 
the flight crew's and pilot's years of experience and training; the actions 
the pilot took just before the plane crash ; as well as actions other pilots had 
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taken in crashes of a similar nature. References to the pilot's record, 
personality or temperament and age are especially common, as are refer-
enCeS to flight crew training and experti se. 
Capt. Larry Davis is a calm man. He's very thoughtful. He doesn' l 
panic. . Davis, 48, has at least 2 J years of flyin g service. He has 
no history of accidents or safety violations (Woolley 1 988b, p. J 8). 
Also reported were the onboard annoutlcements the pilot or the flight 
crew made about upcoming events or appropriate actions (e.g., keep calm ), 
and their heroic actions after the crash (escaping, aiding others, etc.). 
Suddenly in the smoky darkness, he realized that the plane' s pilot 
was buried under several feet of metal and debris. And, miracu-
lously, the pilot was cal mly, slowly guiding his passengers while 
he was pinned down: "S low down, watch your step," the pilot said 
(Minutaglio and Jacobson 1988, p. 15A). 
Not all the fli ght safety themes, however, were positi ve or supportive of 
the fl ight crew, or Delta Airlines. Newspapers reviewed the safety hi story 
of both Delta and DfFW International Airport and found room for improve-
ment. The HOllston Post, in particular, noted the problems that Delta had 
had in the past (at the same time it also noted Delta's overall reputation). 
The Delta Jet crash at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport 
Wednesday eerily resembled the Delta L-J 0 11 smashup at the same 
airport precisely three years ago last month, rai sing questions about 
the air carrier' s safety record .... [Berry] said the carrier's overall 
record is "quite good." Some industry analysts agreed, saying Delta 
has a reputation of a well-run, safe and financially secure airline . 
. But Baron, head of the New York-based air safety group, cited 
a series of problems that have plagued Delta, including an instance 
last July when the crew of a Delta jet shut down two engines, told 
the passengers to get ready to crash and nearly caused the plane to 
plunge into the Pacific Ocean off California. There was nothing 
mechanically wrong wi th the plane (Loddeke 1988, p. 13). 
Help: Rescue Worker Stories 
Finally, the rescue worker stories center on rescue personnel such as 
paramedics, firemen and clergy. They focus on rescue efforts at the scene 
of the crash as well as at the hospital, crash site shelter and morgue. Most 
of the rescue images, however, deal with how fast the emergency personnel 
responded, the actions they took upon arri val, and other rescue or aid efforts. 
Robert Seadore, with the department of public safety at D/FW 
Airport, received an Alert 3 signal close to 9 a. m. In three 
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minutes, Seadore and other department officers were the first 
paramedics on the scene (Minutaglio and Jacobson 1988, p. 15A). 
Photographs complimented these images by depicting rescue workers 
tending survivors , priests and ministers providing comfort and last rites, as 
well as fire fighters and medics transporting survi vors to area hospitals. 
These images convey the sense that help is available and people will be 
there to tend to you, once you get off the plane . This is not to say . however, 
that those trapped, injured, or unable to escape were wi thout aid. 
Taylor said he and other DPS offi cers arri ved at the scene about 
three minutes after the crash. He entered the plane through the 
passenger door and, as the plane continued to burn and fill with 
smoke, Taylor and the other rescue workers found Da vis unab le to 
move and complaining of back pain (Brumley 1988, p. 29). 
Along with the speed at which rescuers responded to the crash were 
references to learning from previous crashes at the DallaslFort Worth 
Airport. The August 1985 Delta 191 crash, for example, provided a training 
ground, as well as a guide, for the 1141 rescue efforts. 
Within minutes after Wednesday morning' s crash, Delta Air Lines 
officials began applying lessons they learned from the crash of 
Delta Flight 191 ... (Van Zelfdon 1988, p. B2). 
Seadore credited the generally quick rescue action to lessons 
learned from the 1985 crash of De lta 191 (Pusey 1988, p. 14). 
Even as emergency crews arrived, clergymen of several denomi-
nati ons began heading for the airport. Many had counseled relatives 
of victims of Delta Fli ght 191 (Sunde 1988, p. 21). 
ImpLications 
Airplane crashes shake the peaceful foundation of our everyday life. The 
resulling news stories are an interesting mix of voyeurism, affirmation and 
reassurance about the safelY of flying and transportation . The stories are 
voyeuristic because they fulfill our hidden desires to know about the 
grotesque detai ls of life, death and mutilation . We read how the plane 
tumbled, crashed and burned; how some died, their bodies found near a 
partially opened but jammed exit and how others survived and escaped. 
Survivor stories, told in detail , reveal their destination, their thoughts as the 
plane crashed, and their actions as they escaped. 
The stories are affirming and reassuring because, against a backdrop of 
drama, they speak of a tradition of strong planes and flight crews. Like the 
captain of a ship, the pilot was the last off the plane and despite severe 
injuries guided passengers though the escape hatch. We also learn the plane 
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was a model of durability and , wi th the exception of a few problems, a safe 
one. In other words, the plane was okay when it left its place of origin and 
was historicall y safe. But somethi ng went very wrong. Something went 
wrong, when the pilot was good, the plane was strong, and the weather was 
fair. A mystery is established in real life and in the newspapers. Stories note 
repeatedly that investigators are searching for clues and "will not speculate 
as to the cause of the crash." Yet, within those same stories are further 
conjectures as to the crash's cause. The mystery is refueled as the story 
reassures uS that someone is trying to solve it. 
The study reveals that disaster news narratives contain more than inac-
curacies, disaster myth s and a means for grieving. The culture of airplane 
disaster discourse also tell s us what to expect when a plane crashes and what 
we might do if we are in a plane crash. Also incl uded are images of normalcy 
tragically disrupted by the crash as well as images of relief personnel and 
aviati on officials working to restore order. Presented as a breakdown in our 
social order, the disaster conveys a clear sense that rescue workers restore 
order in the short-term and aviation officials restore it for the long-term. 
In short, airplane crashes, such as Delta 1141 , remind us that the system 
can fail and people die. Yet, the airplane di saster news stories reassure 
readers because authorities figures , such as the FAA, NTSB and the airlines, 
are depicted as being in command. Vincent, Crow and Davis ( J 989) argue 
that this news frame is "responsible" because it protects the public from 
being "needlessly" alarmed. On the other hand , it also encourage the 
perpetuation of disaster myths; encourages the public's belief that flying is 
safe and there is little they can do about their own safety; and encourages 
the belief th at authorities are in control and are insuring public safety when, 
in fact, thi s may not be happening at all. This "faith" in the FAA and the 
NTSB and the ritual of investigation into the "mystery" of the crash may 
actually help to preserve the status quo. News stories do not challenge the 
institutional process but merely give the reader a sense th at aviation officials 
have command of the system even when it is demonstrating failure. The 
discourse, then, is ultimately hegemonic. 
This is especially true when one considers the fact that despite their 
protests to the contrary, the airline industry does not want the public to be 
aware of the fact that when a di saster does happen passengers will most 
likely have to respond on their own. The airlines act ively encourage the 
belief that airline personnel will be there to assist passengers in a disaster 
and subtly encourage the belief that the safety bri efings, and the information 
contained therein, will not be needed (Safety Study 1985). Yet, NTSB 
studies have shown that fli ght crew survival is no more insured than 
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passengers' and most passenger deaths are not aUributable to the crash itse lf 
but rather to passengers' lack of familiarity with safety procedu res leading 
to their in ability to escape the plane (Safety Study J 985). In other words, 
passengers can achieve some control over their fate if they know what to 
do and are willing and able to take acti on. 
While it is clear that disaster news narrati ves contain information that 
readers can draw upon to shape their own disaster behavior awareness, 
several issues and questions remain. The fi rs t issue is the perception of ri sk. 
Airplane crashes have several features which separate them from other 
"types" of disasters-including unique risk perception characteristics (as 
outlined by Fischhoff et al. 198 1). Flying, for example, is perceived by the 
public to be more dangerous and inherently deadly than driving a car; in 
part, because people fl ying on airplanes often lack the false sense of security 
and control that they feel when driving a car; and in part, because non-sur-
vivable airplane crashes receive more visible and sensational treatment by 
the media (Fi schhoff et al. 198 1; Gamer 1992) . In addition, the perceived 
high risk of fl ying is tempered by the perceived "need" to fl y and the beli ef 
that airplane crash responsibility, response and survival lies solely with 
aviation officials (FAA, NTSB, the airline industry). 
The second issue, and first question , is who is responsible for educating 
the public about airplane safety issues? For the most part thi s issue remains 
outside the jurisdiction of state, county and municipal emergency managers. 
On the fede ral level, the FAA and NTSB 's context for managing airplane 
crashes di ffers from that for managing most techn ologi cal and natural 
di sasters. Here the focus is on "response" by aviati on offi cials afterthe crash 
happens; not on disaster preparation or mitigation . The di saster preparation 
and mitigation practices that do occur focu s primarily on airplane technol-
ogy and fli ght personnel training. Worthy areas to be sure but the emphasis 
is on the prevention of something that can not always be prevented. In all 
three cases (preparation, mitigation and response), the role of the public at 
risk is limited. There is little the public can do it prevent a crash and random 
factors determine survival so the public 's role consists mostly of getting out 
of the airplane if they survive impact. This one act requires preflight safety 
and adaptive behavior preparation; a need the FAA recognizes by their 
regulation that airlines deli ver this information, in the form of safety 
briefings, to on-board passengers by "trained flight personnel. " Yet, these 
individuals are not emergency managers and as studies by the NTSB show 
(Safety Study 1985) in-flight safety presentations and skills are hi ghly 
variable across flights and members of the public at risk. The end result is 
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no one is formally in charge of educating the public abolll risks, vulnerabili-
ties, safety responses on airplanes in a systematic and effective way. 
This leads to question two: Does the mass media have an obligation to 
educate people about transportation disasters, floods, earthquakes and other 
potentially dangerous situations" The answer is yes from at least four 
vantage points. First, because that is ultimately what media do--they 
educate the public about local , national and international events-be they 
polities or disasters. Second, the nature of the intended audience is one they 
have. at least historically, been able to reach fairly well. Unlike in the case 
of floods, volcanoes, or nuclear power plants, the "threatened" population 
lacks clearly defined geographic parameters. Technically, everyone who 
flies is vulnerable to airplane crashes; the result being that the audience in 
"need" of airplane safety information is a mass audience that is ill defined 
at best. Third, the lack of clear responsibility for communicating aviati on 
safety information, coupled with the vaguely defined audience, presents a 
formula that inevitably leads to the mass media doing a better job than the 
current agencies, especially since relatively few of them feel that they have 
a specific charge or duty to educate the public about this issue. Finally, the 
media already serve as disaster warning agents (e.g., Emergency Broadcast 
System) for natural disasters and many have a "disaster plan ," developed 
in conjuncti on with local emergency planning boards (Carter 1980); pro-
viding educational programs on disasterlhazardlrisk mitigation and prepar-
edness (Kreps 1980, p. 36). The media already provides earthquake and 
tornado preparation guides, they could also provide their readers with 
transportation disaster guides. This does not mean that the media should 
have a "disaster plan" for transportation disaster evacuations. It does, 
however, mean that editors should be aware of their pedagogical role and 
provide the public with basic airplane safety behavior information (exit 
locations, crash positions, etc.). It also means that an effective, proactive, 
partnership would need to be developed between the FAA or NTSB and the 
media to ensure presentation of the most accurate and understandable 
information needed. 
This call, however, raises another issue; the reluctance of the transpor-
tation industry to acknowledge disasters and the need for preparation. As 
Molotch and Lester (1974) observed , accidents foster "revelations which 
are otherwise deliberately obfuscated" and they provide us wi th "an impor-
tant resource for learning about" events of which economic in sti tutions 
would rather have us remain unaware (p. 109). News coverage of airplane 
crashes results in the periodic reminders that flying is potentially unsafe; 
the aviation industry system is not perfect; and that people can die if they 
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fly. These reminders usually have short term consequences for not only the 
airlines (lost revenue) but also for related entertainment and travel indus-
tries (such as ho te ls, car rental agencies, etc .). Indeed, some may worry that 
media discussion of plane safety behavior issues cou ld create the impression 
that air travel is always un safe; thereby further threatening the larger 
political economy for which the media are also responsible (Gans 1980). 
Wh ile such concerns are valid, they tend to promote inaction rather than 
action. The media do not create the disasters, they report them. When they 
do report them they can be careful about the passenger behavior reported 
and they can remind readers that survival is possible but they need to learn 
certain adapti ve behaviors. This would not stop people from flying (Safety 
Study, 1985) and would save li ves. As the latest round of crashes reminds 
us, planes and trains are potentially unsafe; but it is equally important to 
recognize that mass tran sit use will increase and passengers need to be told 
clearly and repeatedly how to respond to a di saster. This would probably 
not please the industry , but it would the rest of us who must ride on the 
wings and rai Is of fate. 
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